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Nicomachean Ethics

Nicomachean Ethics

by Aristotle

Read by Geoffrey Edwards · LibriVox

Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle is one of the foundational works of Western philosophy, exploring the nature of happiness, virtue, character, and the good life. Rather than treating ethics as a set of abstract rules, Aristotle examines how… Read more

All chapters (119)

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  1. 1. Chapter I
  2. 2. Chapter II
  3. 3. But to return from this digression.
  4. 4. Chapter IV
  5. 5. Chapter V
  6. 6. Chapter VI
  7. 7. Chapter VII
  8. 8. Chapter VIII
  9. 9. Chapter IX
  10. 10. Chapter X
  11. 11. Chapter XI
  12. 12. Chapter I
  13. 13. Chapter II
  14. 14. Chapter III
  15. 15. Chapter IV
  16. 16. Chapter V
  17. 17. Chapter VI
  18. 18. Chapter VII
  19. 19. Chapter VIII
  20. 20. Chapter IX
  21. 21. Chapter I
  22. 22. Chapter II
  23. 23. Chapter III
  24. 24. Chapter IV
  25. 25. Chapter V
  26. 26. Chapter VI
  27. 27. Chapter VII
  28. 28. Chapter VIII
  29. 29. Chapter IX
  30. 30. Chapter X
  31. 31. Chapter XI
  32. 32. Chapter XII
  33. 33. Chapter XIII
  34. 34. Chapter XIV
  35. 35. Chapter I
  36. 36. Chapter II
  37. 37. Chapter III
  38. 38. Chapter IV
  39. 39. Chapter V
  40. 40. Chapter VI
  41. 41. Chapter VII
  42. 42. Chapter VIII
  43. 43. Chapter IX
  44. 44. Chapter X
  45. 45. Chapter XI
  46. 46. Chapter I
  47. 47. Chapter II
  48. 48. Chapter III
  49. 49. Chapter IV
  50. 50. Chapter V
  51. 51. Chapter VI
  52. 52. Chapter VII
  53. 53. Chapter VIII
  54. 54. Chapter IX
  55. 55. Chapter X
  56. 56. Chapter XI
  57. 57. Chapter XII
  58. 58. Chapter XIII
  59. 59. Chapter XIV
  60. 60. Chapter XV
  61. 61. Chapter XVI
  62. 62. Chapter XVII
  63. 63. Chapter I
  64. 64. Chapter II
  65. 65. Chapter III
  66. 66. Chapter IV
  67. 67. Chapter V
  68. 68. Chapter VI
  69. 69. Chapter VII
  70. 70. Chapter VIII
  71. 71. Chapter IX
  72. 72. Chapter X
  73. 73. Chapter XI
  74. 74. Chapter XII
  75. 75. Appendix
  76. 76. Chapter I
  77. 77. Chapter II
  78. 78. Chapter III
  79. 79. Chapter IV
  80. 80. Chapter V
  81. 81. Chapter VI
  82. 82. Chapter VII
  83. 83. Chapter VIII
  84. 84. Chapter IX
  85. 85. Chapter I
  86. 86. Chapter II
  87. 87. Chapter III
  88. 88. Chapter IV
  89. 89. Chapter V
  90. 90. Chapter VI
  91. 91. Chapter VII
  92. 92. Chapter VIII
  93. 93. Chapter IX
  94. 94. Chapter X
  95. 95. Chapter XI
  96. 96. Chapter XII
  97. 97. Chapter XIII
  98. 98. Chapter XIV
  99. 99. Chapter I
  100. 100. Chapter II
  101. 101. Chapter III
  102. 102. Chapter IV
  103. 103. Chapter V
  104. 104. Chapter VI
  105. 105. Chapter VII
  106. 106. Chapter VIII
  107. 107. Chapter IX
  108. 108. Chapter X
  109. 109. Chapter XI
  110. 110. Chapter XII
  111. 111. Chapter I
  112. 112. Chapter II
  113. 113. Chapter III
  114. 114. Chapter IV
  115. 115. Chapter V
  116. 116. Chapter VI
  117. 117. Chapter VII
  118. 118. Chapter VIII
  119. 119. Notes
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Transcript 45. Chapter XI

The recording is in 1. Chapter I. Open that chapter

Read by Geoffrey Edwards · LibriVox

To speak of Shame as a Virtue is incorrect, because it is much more like a feeling than a moral state. It is defined, we know, to be “a kind of fear of disgrace,” and its effects are similar to those of the fear of danger, for they who feel Shame grow red and they who fear death turn pale. So both are evidently in a way physical, which is thought to be a mark of a feeling rather than a moral state.

Moreover, it is a feeling not suitable to every age, but only to youth: we do think that the young should be Shamefaced, because since they live at the beck and call of passion they do much that is wrong and Shame acts on them as a check. In fact, we praise such young men as are Shamefaced, but no one would ever praise an old man for being given to it, inasmuch as we hold that he ought not to do things which cause Shame; for Shame, since it arises at low bad actions, does not at all belong to the good man, because such ought not to be done at all: nor does it make any difference to allege that some things are disgraceful really, others only because they are thought so; for neither should be done, so that a man ought not to be in the position of feeling Shame. In truth, to be such a man as to do anything disgraceful is the part of a faulty character. And for a man to be such that he would feel Shame if he should do anything disgraceful, and to think that this constitutes him a good man, is absurd: because Shame is felt at voluntary actions only, and a good man will never voluntarily do what is base.

True it is, that Shame may be good on a certain supposition, as “if a man should do such things, he would feel Shame:” but then the Virtues are good in themselves, and not merely in supposed cases. And, granted that impudence and the not being ashamed to do what is disgraceful is base, it does not the more follow that it is good for a man to do such things and feel Shame.

Nor is Self-Control properly a Virtue, but a kind of mixed state: however, all about this shall be set forth in a future Book.

BOOK V

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