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Nicomachean Ethics

Nicomachean Ethics

by Aristotle

Read by Geoffrey Edwards · LibriVox

Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle is one of the foundational works of Western philosophy, exploring the nature of happiness, virtue, character, and the good life. Rather than treating ethics as a set of abstract rules, Aristotle examines how… Read more

All chapters (119)

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  1. 1. Chapter I
  2. 2. Chapter II
  3. 3. But to return from this digression.
  4. 4. Chapter IV
  5. 5. Chapter V
  6. 6. Chapter VI
  7. 7. Chapter VII
  8. 8. Chapter VIII
  9. 9. Chapter IX
  10. 10. Chapter X
  11. 11. Chapter XI
  12. 12. Chapter I
  13. 13. Chapter II
  14. 14. Chapter III
  15. 15. Chapter IV
  16. 16. Chapter V
  17. 17. Chapter VI
  18. 18. Chapter VII
  19. 19. Chapter VIII
  20. 20. Chapter IX
  21. 21. Chapter I
  22. 22. Chapter II
  23. 23. Chapter III
  24. 24. Chapter IV
  25. 25. Chapter V
  26. 26. Chapter VI
  27. 27. Chapter VII
  28. 28. Chapter VIII
  29. 29. Chapter IX
  30. 30. Chapter X
  31. 31. Chapter XI
  32. 32. Chapter XII
  33. 33. Chapter XIII
  34. 34. Chapter XIV
  35. 35. Chapter I
  36. 36. Chapter II
  37. 37. Chapter III
  38. 38. Chapter IV
  39. 39. Chapter V
  40. 40. Chapter VI
  41. 41. Chapter VII
  42. 42. Chapter VIII
  43. 43. Chapter IX
  44. 44. Chapter X
  45. 45. Chapter XI
  46. 46. Chapter I
  47. 47. Chapter II
  48. 48. Chapter III
  49. 49. Chapter IV
  50. 50. Chapter V
  51. 51. Chapter VI
  52. 52. Chapter VII
  53. 53. Chapter VIII
  54. 54. Chapter IX
  55. 55. Chapter X
  56. 56. Chapter XI
  57. 57. Chapter XII
  58. 58. Chapter XIII
  59. 59. Chapter XIV
  60. 60. Chapter XV
  61. 61. Chapter XVI
  62. 62. Chapter XVII
  63. 63. Chapter I
  64. 64. Chapter II
  65. 65. Chapter III
  66. 66. Chapter IV
  67. 67. Chapter V
  68. 68. Chapter VI
  69. 69. Chapter VII
  70. 70. Chapter VIII
  71. 71. Chapter IX
  72. 72. Chapter X
  73. 73. Chapter XI
  74. 74. Chapter XII
  75. 75. Appendix
  76. 76. Chapter I
  77. 77. Chapter II
  78. 78. Chapter III
  79. 79. Chapter IV
  80. 80. Chapter V
  81. 81. Chapter VI
  82. 82. Chapter VII
  83. 83. Chapter VIII
  84. 84. Chapter IX
  85. 85. Chapter I
  86. 86. Chapter II
  87. 87. Chapter III
  88. 88. Chapter IV
  89. 89. Chapter V
  90. 90. Chapter VI
  91. 91. Chapter VII
  92. 92. Chapter VIII
  93. 93. Chapter IX
  94. 94. Chapter X
  95. 95. Chapter XI
  96. 96. Chapter XII
  97. 97. Chapter XIII
  98. 98. Chapter XIV
  99. 99. Chapter I
  100. 100. Chapter II
  101. 101. Chapter III
  102. 102. Chapter IV
  103. 103. Chapter V
  104. 104. Chapter VI
  105. 105. Chapter VII
  106. 106. Chapter VIII
  107. 107. Chapter IX
  108. 108. Chapter X
  109. 109. Chapter XI
  110. 110. Chapter XII
  111. 111. Chapter I
  112. 112. Chapter II
  113. 113. Chapter III
  114. 114. Chapter IV
  115. 115. Chapter V
  116. 116. Chapter VI
  117. 117. Chapter VII
  118. 118. Chapter VIII
  119. 119. Notes
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Transcript 104. Chapter VI

The recording is in 1. Chapter I. Open that chapter

Read by Geoffrey Edwards · LibriVox

Unity of Sentiment is also plainly connected with Friendship, and therefore is not the same as Unity of Opinion, because this might exist even between people unacquainted with one another.

Nor do men usually say people are united in sentiment merely because they agree in opinion on point, as, for instance, on points of astronomical science (Unity of Sentiment herein not having any connection with Friendship), but they say that Communities have Unity of Sentiment when they agree respecting points of expediency and take the same line and carry out what has been determined in common consultation.

Thus we see that Unity of Sentiment has for its object matters of action, and such of these as are of importance, and of mutual, or, in the case of single States, common, interest: when, for instance, all agree in the choice of magistrates, or forming alliance with the Lacedæmonians, or appointing Pittacus ruler (that is to say, supposing he himself was willing). But when each wishes himself to be in power (as the brothers in the Phœnissæ), they quarrel and form parties: for, plainly, Unity of Sentiment does not merely imply that each entertains the same idea be it what it may, but that they do so in respect of the same object, as when both the populace and the sensible men of a State desire that the best men should be in office, because then all attain their object.

Thus Unity of Sentiment is plainly a social Friendship, as it is also said to be: since it has for its object-matter things expedient and relating to life.

And this Unity exists among the good: for they have it towards themselves and towards one another, being, if I may be allowed the expression, in the same position: I mean, the wishes of such men are steady and do not ebb and flow like the Euripus, and they wish what is just and expedient and aim at these things in common.

The bad, on the contrary, can as little have Unity of Sentiment as they can be real friends, except to a very slight extent, desiring as they do unfair advantage in things profitable while they shirk labour and service for the common good: and while each man wishes for these things for himself he is jealous of and hinders his neighbour: and as they do not watch over the common good it is lost. The result is that they quarrel while they are for keeping one another to work but are not willing to perform their just share.

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